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DOMESTIC LEGISLATION AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA CONFERENCE 
Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.* 
Mr. Chairman, I have been intrigued for many years over the 
question: Is the cause of international peace advanced best by diplo-
mats negotiating treaties or by commercial interests broadening 
their commercial trade and investments in other countries? 
A fair case can be made, I think, that commercial enterprises 
do a better job than diplomats in bringing the nations of the world 
closer together, and in lessening, or at least inhibiting the forces that 
lead nations into warfare. When one nation's businesses have sub-
stantial investments in foreign countries, there certainly seems to 
be a certain reluctance to bomb those countries back into the stone 
age. The broadening of trade relationships, increased interdepen-
dency on materials and products, international monetary exchanges 
and loan guarantees, airline landing rights, and steamship trans-
portation rights - all commercial relationships - may often be 
more helpful to world peace than the painful pace of diplomatic 
negotiations amongst sovereign nations. 
This question squarely underlies an issue now facing the United 
States Congress: Should the Congress unilaterally enact a law en-
couraging United States industry, in partnership with foreign corpo-
rations, to mine the seabed? Or should Congress hold legislation 
pending the conclusion of the current negotiations? Since unilateral 
action by the United States may scuttle the current treaty negotia-
tions, this question involves a major choice: Whether to maintain 
the momentum of continuing United States leadership in deep 
seabed mining technology development or to support the signifi-
cant, but slow, progress we have made in negotiating a far-reaching 
and historic new international law of the sea treaty. 
The benefits of a treaty cannot be understated. In our own 
history as a nation, disputes on the oceans have often led us into 
war. Consider the following: Privateering against United States 
shipping by Great Britain was a contributing cause of our Revolu-
tionary War, and probably the major cause of the War of 1812. In 
our Civil War, the naval blockade against the Confederacy - and 
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European acceptance of that blockade - was probably the key 
factor which prevented the South from permanently dividing the 
nation. The sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor in 1898 trig-
gered the Spanish American War. The sinking of the Lusitania and 
U-boat activity against United States ships was a material factor in 
moving us towards involvement in World War I. More recently we 
see cases like that of the Pueblo and the Mayaguez bringing us close 
to confrontation. In the case of the Pueblo, for example, our 'Navy, 
in its wisdom and with a certain propensity to test the will of foreign 
nations, chose to deliberately send the Pueblo within the claimed 
territorial sea of Korea - a claim which we did not recognize as 
valid under international law. We should not forget how close we 
Americans came to going to war rather than accept that seizure and 
the later humiliation of the United States Navy crew. When the 
Cambodians seized the Mayaguez, again in disputed waters, Presi-
dent Ford did commit marines to recover the crew. And finally, 
there is the famous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 1 This fatal mistake 
by Congress, which permitted us to later become involved in a major 
and disasterous war without the Declaration of War required by the 
Constitution, resulted from the Navy's decision to send two destroy-
ers, the C. Turner Joy and the Maddox, within a 12-mile limit 
claimed by North Vietnam, and within a few hours steaming dist-
ance of an ongoing amphibious operation by our allies, the South 
Vietnamese. 
So we have a great deal to gain from a treaty: Finalizing of 
territorial seas at twelve miles; guarantees of free transit through 
and over straits; agreement on firm definitions of the rights of all 
countries within a 200-mile economic zone; and, perhaps most im-
portant, establishment of a system of dispute settlement for con-
flicts involving ocean issues. Establishment of these principles 
would constitute a tremendous step towards reducing conflict and 
tension on over two-thirds of the earth's surface. 
On the other hand, should the Congress give up on the slow 
pace of the Law of the Sea Conference negotiations, now stretching 
into their sixth year? 
Congressional impatience stems not only from the slow pace of 
the negotiations but also from the recognition that after the succes-
sive unproductive negotiating sessions on the deep seabed portion 
of the treaty, agreement on language acceptable to the United 
1. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). 
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States Senate is now regarded as unlikely, if not impossible, by most 
Members of Congress who have followed the negotiations, as well as 
by the White House. Unilateral legislative action that will permit 
United States corporations to proceed with deep seabed mining, 
therefore, is inevitable during this Congress. That this will have a 
significant international impact, similar to the impact of the unilat-
eral action of the United States in establishing a 200-mile zone for 
fishing conservation, 2 is clear. But will legislative action in fact 
destroy the substantial progress that the Law of the Sea Conference 
has made to date? A good case can be made that it will. Delegates 
to the Conference who would like to disrupt the proceedings could 
use the United States action for that purpose. 
It is regrettable that these unprecedented negotiations might 
come to a halt at the eleventh hour. The people of the world share 
a common interest in conserving and utilizing the resources of the 
oceans, in protecting freedom of navigation, in protecting the mar-
ine environment from pollution, and in enhancing scientific knowl-
edge of the oceans. Failure to achieve agreement can exacerbate the 
same tensions and ambiguities which have so often led to conflict 
in the past. Failure will also hurt those nations which can least 
afford it, namely those which cannot defend their interests. Adop-
tion of a new dispute-settlement mechanism covering two-thirds of 
the world's surface could be the most significant step towards peace 
in this century. 
I personally have opposed unilateral action to date because of 
my view that a new comprehensive international law of the sea is 
far more valuable to the United States than is the early use of 
United States technology to obtain a new source of nickel, cobalt, 
and copper. I view the dispute settlement procedures in the treaty 
alone as being of far greater ultimate worth to the people of the 
United States than a guaranteed source of these particular metals. 
After all, there are at least ten other essential metals (with an im-
port dependence of greater than 80 percent) upon which we will 
always require foreign developing countries for sources. 
But my view is not the majority view of my colleagues in the 
House and Senate. The clear majority view is that any Law of the 
Sea Treaty negotiated by the United States must guarantee access 
to the deep seabed for United States companies. Without clearly 
guaranteed access for United States ~ompanies, there is simply no 
2. Fishery Conservation Zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). 
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hope that the United States Senate will ever ratify a Law of the Sea 
Treaty. That majority view of the House of Representatives, and I 
believe the Senate as well, is probably fairly accurately set forth in 
the following letter sent to President Carter on January 29, 1979, by 
Chairman Murphy and Breaux of the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee and Oceanography Subcommittee, respec-
tively: 
NINrT'Y•Sl>CTH CONCl9'E&S 
JOHN fill , NUltl"HY, N.Y., CHAUUllAN 
TMOMAI L. ASH UY, OH10 
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!,!.':!~) MDC~~.XA, TEX. 
GPR:Y I: , l'T\.1008, MAii. 
DAVID It. 90Wl:N, Miii, 
CAlllllOLL~D, JR. ,KY, 
DON 90f«U, WASH. 
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JAMl:I L. 09C"ITAR: , M.INN, 
WILUAM J , HUOHl.I, N ,J , 
MAMIU A. MIKUL9KI, MO, 
OAY10 L 90HIOR, MICH. 
DANll:L K. AKAXA, HAWAII 
MICHAaL OZZll: NYl:R:I, PA. 
JOC WYATT, TSlC. 
MIKI: LOWRY, WASH. 
KARL HUTTO, n.A. 
&DWMO J . STACK, l"\.A. •&AH DOM4KU.Y, MA98, 
PAUL H . MC CLOSKrt, JR,, CALU'. 
Cll:HI: SHYO&JI , KY. 
llOWIN • • P'OfllYTHll, N.J, 
DAVID C . Tfll:Df, L.A. 
JOl:L "'ITCKAAO, WA.SH, 
DON YOUNG, ALASKA 
R091:R:T & . aAUMAH, MO. 
HORMAN P', UHT, N , Y, 
DAVID f'. aMl: .. Y, MA.IHI: 
ROaUn K , DCMl'NAN, CALIP', 
THOMA.I • • SVAHI, Jft ., 01.L. 
P'AUL S , TR: llk.11, J .. . , VA. 
lt091E"T W. OAV19, MICH. 
WIU.IAN CARNEY, N. Y, 
MELVIN H. IEVAH9, V,I, 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 20500 
Dear Mr. President: 
11.6. -OUUt of l\tprtUtntatibt• 
<ommittte on 
-mbant -arint anll .1 iSf)trit• 
l\aom \ 334. 1.anglllarfb -.Oun elficr JIJ11ilbing 
Rla•bington, m.€. 20515 
Otlll'W aTAl'P .......... _ 
January 29, 1979 
We are compelled to raise a matter about which we are gravely 
concerned. The United States delegation to the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea appears to be engaged in a 
headlong rush to the conclusion of a comprehensive oceans treaty 
which is inimical to critically important interests of the United 
States. This effort is being undertaken without adequate considera-
tion of Congressional opinion. Indeed, we are convinced that, unless 
remedied, this defect in the process is likely to lead to the conclusion 
of a treaty which will be signed by the United States, ratified by 
more than 100 foreign States, but which will fail to obtain Senate 
approval. We hardly need point out the international consequences. 
A major, long-standing policy of the United States at the Law 
of the Sea negotiations has been to achieve assured access by this 
nation to the minerals of the international deep seabed. Those min-
erals include, among others, cobalt, manganese, and nickel, each of 
which is essential to the production of high quality steel and special-
ized alloys for high technology items. Commercially attractive 
quantities of copper are also on the deep seabed. 
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It is clear that the United States and other western industrial-
ized countries, whose economic and political interests are very dif-
ferent from those of the Third World and East Bloc, would be in a 
distinct minority in the International Seabed Authority which 
would supervise and control ocean mining under the treaty regime. 
Consequently, until recently, the United States has sought to nego-
tiate at the Law of the Sea Conference a detailed mining code 
clearly setting forth reasonable conditions of access and carefully 
circumscribing the rulemaking and discretionary powers of the Au-
thority. 
There is at present, however, a movement by the delegation to 
consider a simplified treaty text. The theory is that the complexities 
of the detailed approach are too great to permit the resolution of 
major outstanding issues by the Conference in a viable time frame. 
The developing countries are calling for an early end to these pro-
tracted negotiations. What is contemplated, therefore, on both sides 
is a negotiation at the Conference of relatively undetailed treaty 
provisions which would be fleshed out by an interim organization 
prior to ratification. 
The difficulty is that this approach would call upon the United 
States to sign a treaty without knowing whether access to ocean 
minerals would be assured; it would be, in essence, a blank check. 
The argument that we would insist upon an interim organization 
structured to protect our interests in developing rules and a perma-
nent procedure which would not allow the rules to be undone against 
our interests is unpersuasive. The Third World will not accept that 
kind of situation. The long history of negotiations and the ideo-
logical nature of the Third World position make this abundantly 
clear. At best, our ability to protect our interests would have to be 
ambiguous to be widely acceptable among the developing countries. 
Once signed by more than 150 nations, the treaty would change the 
political and legal equation greatly. If the interim oranization failed 
to produce assured access in the detailed regime, and the United 
States failed to ratify, the cost would be far higher to this country 
than if the treaty were not concluded in the first instance. Realizing 
that, the Third World would apply greater pressure in the interim 
organization to achieve its aims. Our ability to protect our interests 
would be substantially diminished. 
There are other grave problems, insofar as the delegation has 
developed an unclassified, officially uncontrolled document reflect-
ing not only the simplification approach, but also numerous sub-
stantive provisions highly prejudicial to United States interests. 
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Mandatory transfer of technology as a practical condition of access; 
a seabed mining production ceiling, which while time limited on its 
face, would insure politically that the ceiling would be renegotiated 
to become indefinite·; a national quota system for mine site alloca-
tion; a system of selection of applicants for mine sites badly tilted 
toward joint ventures which would benefit the Third World and not 
the United States; a moratorium on ocean mining of manganese 
nodules twenty-five years after the treaty enters into force, which 
while not legally automatic, would be politically inevitable precisely 
at the time the national need for the minerals became acute; a 
moratorium on all mining of non-manganese nodule minerals, pend-
ing adoption of a regime for them; and a system of governance for 
the Authority which would fail to protect U.S. interests adequately. 
In short, access would not be assured. Moreover, mandatory 
transfer of technology and a production ceiling violate clear, long-
standing United States policy on technology transfer and commod-
ity arrangements. The results of these two features, alone, are bound 
to be adverse in terms of technological innovation, inflation, na-
tional balance of payments, and jobs. 
As a whole, the provisions in the delegation document would 
deny the United States security of supply of vital seabed minerals 
for the indefinite future. The delegation denies that the document 
reflects a United States position, but the impression of foreign 
States is to the contrary and delegation testimony on key issues 
during Congressional hearings indicates that those States are cor-
rect. 
The balance of the treaty offers the United States little if any, 
advantage over customary law, so far as the continental shelf and 
fisheries are concerned. The treaty regime for marine scientific re-
search is highly restrictive. The navigation regime contains danger-
ous ambiguities which almost certainly would be interpreted to the 
disadvantage of our maritime interests, notwithstanding the fact 
that global commercial and military interests dictate relative free-
dom of movement on the seas. As far as the system of dispute 
settlement under the treaty is concerned, it is so complex and 
fraught with exceptions that it is likely to be of little practical value. 
In short, the abandonment of deep ocean minerals cannot be justi-
fied on the basis of benefits to be derived from other elements of the 
treaty. 
Mr. President, we urge your personal intervention to assure 
that the Congress is heard and its views properly taken into account 
before the United States delegation places the nation in a seriously 
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adverse position. Implementation of the Panama Canal treaties and 
the ratification of SALT II already promise to place a severe strain 
on the ability of the Congress to accommodate Administration for-
eign policy. We are convinced that a Law of the Sea treaty such as 
that which the delegation is apparently prepared to accept-not-
withstanding unconvincing caveats to the contrary-would be more 
than the political traffic could bear. 
Sincerely, 
JOHN B. BREAUX 
Chairman 
Subcommittee on Oceanography 
JOHN M. MURPHY 
Chairman 
Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries 
I disagree with the letter, and particularly with its criticism of 
the United States Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference. 
Again, I believe it is inevitable that an impatient Congress will pass 
deep seabed mining legislation during this Congress. The question 
then is, what should this historic and precedent-setting legislation 
contain? Our experience with legislation of international impact has 
taught us that clear and careful draftsmanship is rqui:red. The Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act3 provides a good example. 
Our self-serving exception regarding tuna has resulted in bad rela-
tions with many developing countries whose expanded economic 
zones can be the source of productive tuna fishing. These countries 
refuse to recognize our provincial position that we will not regulate 
tuna fishing in our 200-mile zone (where tuna rarely go), and they 
cannot regulate tuna fishing in their 200-mile zones (where tuna do 
go). These countries have understandably excluded the United 
States from recent negotiations to establish regional management 
schemes. 
In addition, it is clear that after the United States enacts a deep 
seabed mining bill other countries of the world will use that bill as 
a model and will enact similar legislation. This being so, our bill 
should at a minimum include the following concepts: 
3. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976)). 
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(1) Recognition of the "common heritage of mankind" and the 
anticipated conclusion of a fair treaty. 
(2) Establishment of a revenue sharing fund for distribution to the 
entire international community when a suitable treaty can be nego-
tiated. 
(3) Preservation of the concept of freedom of the seas. 
( 4) No appearance of an assertion of sovereignty over any portion 
of the seabed. 
(5) Comprehensive environmental protection, resource manage-
ment, and safety. 
(6) Acceptable provision for international tax and customs policy. 
(7) Free location of processing plants. 
(8) Free choice of construction and flag of mining, processing, and 
transportation vessels. 
(9) Antitrust review prior to license issuance. 
(10) Reasonably precise definition of the terms, conditions, and 
restrictions on licensing. 
I believe that the language of H.R. 3350, reported out of this 
Committee by unanimous voice vote in 1977,' can be easily 
amended to reflect the recommendations I have offered above. I will 
shortly introduce, for the Committee's consideration, a series of 
amendments to H.R. 3350 which would accomplish these purposes. 
4. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. HULL: Thank you very much Congressman McCloskey. We 
will now receive questions from the panel. 
PROF. GOLDIE: Congressman, I feel very supportive of your view 
about a simplified treaty. However, there is one further problem 
that could arise. Julius Stone, my former professor at the law school 
in Sidney, Australia and also my professor at Harvard, has recently 
published a book called Conflict Through Consensus. 1 I do remem-
ber it as one of the most sophisticated analyses of consensus politics 
that I have ever read. The case study that this book emphasizes is 
that of the definition of aggression. Stone pointed out that the final 
G.A. resolution on the definition of aggression2 is so broad that it 
lets anybody interpret it more or less as they please. He is thereby 
following his own philosophy about the mutability of words. But 
there is more to it than that. There are compromises of opposites in 
many of the key phrases. I think one concern that one should have 
with regard to a more generalized format is that a consensus that 
has led to these generalizations is simply a disguise for linguistic 
gymnastics and for political warfare, which Julius also calls the 
conflict situation. If agreement of opposites is achieved by general 
phrasiology, then I think that such a convention as you have envi-
sioned could not, because of its very nature, assure the freedom of 
access to which I think there is American consensus on all sides. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I am not sure I understand what you 
said in your conclusion. What do you mean by "there is an Ameri-
can consensus on all sides?" 
PROF. GOLDIE: I think that most Americans, whether they have 
opposed or supported the deep seabed mining bill since the first one 
was brought forward in 1972, would not argue that access to seabed 
resources should be denied. That is, they would argue that there 
should be freedom of access. The question has been one of modali-
ties through a universal organ or an international organization. Peo-
ple who have opposed the bill have largely done so on the basis that 
it will stultify the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the 
Sea.3 Or they oppose it for other reasons that are similar, such as 
1. J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS (1977). 
2. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 1 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974). 
3. The deep seabed mining bills proposed since 1972 are: H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977); S. 2085, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 11879, 
94th Cong., 2nd Ses&. (1976); S. 713, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976); H.R. 12233, 93rd Cong., 
2nd Sess. (1974); H.R. 9, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1134, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); 
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environmental reasons. But it seems to me that offhand I do not 
recall anybody who has said that the seas are inviolate and that no 
one should have access to them, more or less on a basis of right 
rather than a basis of concession. 
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: You have fu~ther confused me. I had 
thought that it was the American concensus, it certainly is not the 
concensus of the Congress, that we have the right of access at this 
point and that we have delayed it only because we anticipated, 
within a reasonable period of time, an international regime could be 
worked out. We now find that the nine years from 1970 to 1979 does 
not constitute a reasonable period of time and that what is coming 
out of the treaty text does not give guaranteed access. 
PROF. GOLDIE: That is exactly what I was saying. What I was 
really stressing, however, was not concern for right of a~cess as 
such, taking that as a given, but rather the question of sufficient 
clarity of draftsmanship. The conflict through consensus, to use a 
shorthand phrase, is not inherent in the short form of a convention. 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Mr. Congressman, I would like to note 
that the letter which you quoted from has been answered by Secre-
tary · Vance on behalf of the President. Since Elliott wrote the an-
swer, you will understand that it does not take too kindly to the 
letter's characterization of the delegation and its irresponsible atti-
tude. Rather, in summary, it accuses Congressman Murphy and 
Breaux of distorting the facts in terms of what our positions have 
been, what we are trying to do, and to some extent, the judgments 
on the consequences of action. I would note that I think it is entirely 
possible that those, who in the past, moved us into the channel of 
negotiating endless detail did so in order to insure that we did not 
end up with a treaty. I have felt that anybody with experience in 
international law, the development of international law and nego-
tiation of treaties who looks at the kinds of details that we have been 
trying to include in the treaty over recent years, would have to say 
that we are going against all tradition. We are failing to recognize 
that international law is opposed to any of our national legal sys-
tems and is a very primative system. You cannot do the kinds of fine 
tuning that those drafts have tried to do. Namely, fine tuning what 
various international organs cannot do, what their interrelations 
are, and where they can issue regulations and where they cannot. 
The simplified text to which Congressmen Murphy and Breaux 
H.R. 14918, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972); H.R. 13076, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972); S. 2801, 
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1972). 
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take such exception in my judgment frightens them, and frightens 
the mining industry, not because it falls short in terms of giving 
assurances of access but rather because it is within the scope of what 
we might in fact be able to negotiate. It looks like a real treaty. They 
suddenly see it for the first time and they get worried that we might 
in fact be about to conclude a treaty. And that is why they are 
nervous about it. Actually I hope they are nervous on that ground 
because I think they are going to have to reconsider the value of a 
treaty as opposed to the value of an embittered and prolonged im-
pass in the international society. 
I would say that much of the detail which is in the present text 
is probably necessary and non-controversial. But the text which 
they criticize states clearly and in workable terms, things which are 
unworkable and poorly stated in the text before the Conference. The 
simplified text also recognizes the inevitability of negotiating many 
more details to make, what we call, the rules and regulations of this 
international authority. It proposes that this be done essentially 
between the signature of the treaty and the entry into force of the 
treaty. It has been my assumption, and Elliot's assumption, that we 
cannot expect the Senate of the United States to give its approval 
to the Law of the Sea Treaty unless it can see what it means in 
detail. But this does not seem to us to be the same thing as saying 
that all these terms have to be in the treaty. It may mean that we 
have to work out rules and regulations before codification. But 
under any practice of recent years, there is a period of years between 
signature and entry into force of a treaty of this sort, and that time 
can be utilized to work out the rules and regulations. I would suggest 
that we would never have better leverage than in a situation where 
it was clear that the Senate's willingness to give its advice and 
consent to the treaty depended on these rules and regulations imple-
menting the treaty in a responsible fashion which made mining 
economical and possible. This would not be done in a politicized 
conference of ambassadors to the United Nations but rather in a 
continuous twelve-month a year working group from the various 
mining democracies around the world. So, at any rate, it may be 
harsh of me to suspect the motives of some of these people. I cer-
tainly do not know and would not want to say that Congressmen 
Murphy and Breaux in fact do not want a treaty. But some of the 
people who are pushing them and some of the people representing 
the mining industry misguidedly do not want a treaty. And I think 
that is mainly what is behind it. 
MR. HULL: George, I would like to pick up on your point in order 
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to underscore the one that Congressman McCloskey made earlier. 
If one has a generalized treaty which contains dispute settlement 
provisions, the advancement of international law will be great and 
the whole issue that we are dealing with will be pushed forward to 
a point where, I think, we would all be very proud and feel very 
secure. I want to state as a footnote what I have always found is both 
a paradox and a potential parade of horribles. It relates back to the 
earlier comment that was made about the hypothetical fishing ves-
sels and the rule of the road that Fred referred to. We all assume 
that without a treaty there will be seabed mining solely by the 
United States and that we will be able to mine as we wish. In point 
of fact, that may be the way it is now, but we must bear in mind 
the history of the United States. If there is a challenge we are not 
about to begin an undeclared war, that Pete referred to earlier. We 
have the potential situation of the United States Congress passing 
a deep seabed mining bill and everyone wanting to go out and mine 
the deep seabed. We have at the same time the possibility that the 
rest of the world will continue negotiating and come up with a 
convention which says there can be no mining without the consent 
of the international authority. We would then be left with a rather 
difficult problem. However, it is one for which history provides a 
very clear answer in terms of what the United States would do in 
such a situation. Would we go ahead and mine, thus risking conflict 
and setting in motion that undeclared state of war? Or would we 
submit as was the case, for instance, in Ecuador? I pose this as a 
footnote but if someone would like to respond to it that would be 
fine with me. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I think that the State Department 
rather than the Congress ought to respond to that question. I did 
not mean by my earlier comments to say that the State Department 
was limited by what Congress might do. But the Defense Depart-
ment will certainly be limited by what Congress does or does not 
require for the protection of United States seabed mining claims or 
operations. 
MR. YouNG: I would like to make comment on George Aldrich's 
remark from the point of view of industry of which I am not a 
spokesman. He said there are those in the industry who do not want 
a treaty. That may be so. But I would be inclined to say that the 
more accurate statement would be that the industry, in general, 
would prefer a treaty of a kind that would be acceptable to it. It does 
not want what industry would call a bad treaty and there are things 
about the draft which make it a bad treaty from that point of view. 
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I did have one other question for Congressman McCloskey. Mr. 
Herman, a little while ago, referred to the political repercussions 
that might ensue on the international scene if national legislation 
were to be adopted. Looking forward to congressional action on this 
issue, do you think that anticipation of repercussions is likely to be 
an influential factor on the congressional debate? 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I do not think so. Congress at one 
time had a kind of bi-partisan support of an administration of either 
party in matters of foreign policy. But ever since Ambassador Moy-
nahan at the United Nations spoke out in condemnation of the 
rhetoric that came from the Third World at the General Assembly, 
and received the broad approval of the American public, it has been 
politic for Members of Congress to not indicate a strong support of 
the United Nations that as might cause them to be defeated by their 
electorate. This is an unfortunate reality. There are two aspects of 
this that should be understood fully by the public and by those with 
whom we negotiate. First the attention of the American people 
today is turned entirely inward upon inflation, taxes, and what they 
perceive as over-regulation by government. Second, the regulation 
that will be imposed by the new Deep Seabed Authority will be 
perceived by many of my colleagues in the Congress as the same 
type of over-regulation of business that occurs domestically, for ex-
ample, the Securities and Exchange Commission or the environ-
mental regulations. We have seen with Proposition 13 in California4 
a rise against over regulation. This will be a potent argument in the 
Congress against accepting a treaty which appears to have a com-
plex and hardly understandable regulation of the businesses which 
conduct deep seabed mining. 
A third point that ought to be clearly understood is that be-
cause of Vietnam, because of an arrogance of executive power, be-
cause of a feeling that we in the Congress unduly delegated our 
power to declare war to the President, and because of our ability to 
determine the truth from diplomats over a period of years, most of 
my colleagues, including the two-thirds that have been elected in 
the last six years, have run on the platform and strongly believe that 
the Congress should be independent of the Executive Branch in 
matters of foreign policy. In this principle they are strongly sup-
ported by their constituants. It has been only by fairly narrow mar-
gins that a President has been able to obtain ratification of the 
4. CAL. CONST. art. 13A (West Supp. 1979). 
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Panama Canal Treaty,5 been able to obtain congressional support 
of the sanctions on Rhodesian chrome,6 has been able to obtain 
congressional support for the balanced sale of weapons to Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, as well as Israel. The Congress is skeptical as to 
whether or not it supports the Executive Branch in the negotiation 
of treaties which may or may not, be perceived by the American 
people to be advantageous. This is no idle threat. The final para-
graph of the Murphy-Breaux letter where they point out that SALT 
II and the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty might be 
about all the Congress can be expected to bear in going along with 
the Executive Branch and that this kind of a deep seabed regime 
would just be the final straw that broke the camel's back is not what 
some of us might call an attempt at blackmail. I am not at all sure, 
for example, that the Senate is prepared to ratify SALT II. Further, 
it is going to be a very close question whether we pass legislation on 
the Panama Canal treaties in the House. But this new relationship 
between Congress and the Executive ought to be fully understood 
by the negotiating parties at Geneva. We quite often find that for-
eign nations believe that what Congress is doing is essentially a 
rubber stamp of the administration's effort. Thus, this Murphy-
Breaux letter may have been triggered, for example, by the adminis-
tration in an attempt to use it as a bargaining tool in the negotia-
tions by showing their fellow negotiators that they cannot negotiate 
with them because Congress forbids it. But I can assure you that the 
sentiments in the Breaux-Murphy letter with which I disagree are 
the true sentiments of the Congress and could be reflected in a vote 
which would overwhelm the best intentions of this administration 
to negotiate a fair treaty. 
I want to say that of all of the foreign policy actions conducted 
by this administration, many of which appear to be in confusion, I 
think that the effort they have made in the law of the sea negotia-
tions demonstrates the best craftsmanship and the best correlation 
of the always differing views of the many officers of the United 
States Government, that it has made to date. Ambassador Richard-
son and Ambassador Aldrich have done a superb job in what they 
are attempting to do. But what they are attempting to do may 
plainly be impossible, and that is the concern that I have. I am 
5. For the issues and controversies surrounding the ratification of the Panama Canal 
Treaties, see Rugin, The Panama Canal Treaties: Keys to the Locks, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 
159 (1978). 
6. 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1976). 
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afraid that this impossibility will reflect on the passage of this legis-
lation. 
MR. HERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat hesitant to get 
involved in a discussion of the internal legislative processes of the 
United States as I represent a foreign government. Consequently, I 
would not want to comment on the specifics of proposals that were 
before the Congress. I just think it is worth noting that while action 
on the part of a national legislature with respect to seabed mining 
can be justified in terms of the domestic law as a freedom of the high 
seas, I think what I said before is worth bearing in mind. It is by no 
means certain that, under conventional and customary interna-
tional law, seabed mining is supportive as a freedom of the high 
seas. Nor in my view is it certain that traditional concepts of res 
nullius with respect to the seabed as opposed to the water column 
admits of activity which purports to exercise some measure of exclu-
sivity over an area or the resources. All that means is that the 
reaction of the international community to legislation on the part 
of one or another municipal legislature is hard to gauge. It is possi-
ble that the reaction would be manifested in a number of ways, all 
political, before a variety of bodies, such as the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development which will be meeting in 
May, 1979, in the United Nations General Assembly. There is also 
the possibility of some attempt by the General Assembly to ulti-
mately refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. That 
does not mean that freedom of the high seas would not be vindicated 
ultimately. But it strikes me that in the short term or the medium 
term there are going to be a lot of uncertainties. And if the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is eventually seized of this matter, these 
uncertainties could continue for some time. We have to ask our-
selves what the result might be on the viability of the International 
Court of Justice as an ultimate dispute settling body in the case of 
an issue as contentious as this one. What happens to the respect of 
that body if it decides an issue which is highly contentious and 
which does not meet the major preoccupations of one or another 
major State? I only hope that if the Congress is going to pass legisla-
tion in 1979, it almost did in 1978, that it is doing so because there 
is a demonstrated legislative gap that is necessary to be filled to 
meet the concerns of United States citizens. 
Finally I think it is incumbent on me to point out that, while 
suggestions have been made that present seabed provisions are ter-
rible, concession to the treaty under these conditions would not 
overcome its advantages. While it is difficult to analyze all the 
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provisions of the law of the sea treaty or the treaty reflected in the 
Informal Composit Negotiating Text (ICNT)7 with respect to every 
nations expectations and interests, I think we have to recognize that 
if nothing else, leaving aside the seabed provisions and Part XI of 
the ICNT, we are very close to agreement on a number of other 
provisions. Those provisions would define the limits of the territorial 
sea, 8 would enshrine the right of virtually unfettered passage 
through the territorial sea, 9 would fix limits to continental shelf 
claims, 18 would provide for unimpeded transit through straits, 11 
would allow submarines to transit international straits underwa-
ter,12 and would allow for overflight over those straits. 13 We do not 
have that in conventional or customary international law but the 
ICNT would provide it. It would do a range of things to avoid con-
flicts in fishery matters. I think it is a bit simplistic to suggest that 
there are no advantages to be gained by the current provisions in 
the ICNT in areas other than the seabed treaty and that conven-
tional or customary international law will answer all the needs of 
maritime states. I think that needs a hard and close look before such 
a conclusion can be reached. I have some particular comments on 
the House version of the bill but I will leave those and, if we have 
time, I would like to get back to them. Thank you. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say 
that I agree completely with Mr. Herman's statement. I am also in 
strong disagreement with the Murphy-Breaux letter which contends 
that there are not valuable protections to the United States interests 
in the provisions other than the deep seabed provision. I think that 
the treaty in nearly every respect, except for the deep seabed ques-
tion, does represent an advancement to the interests of the United 
States. Perhaps the single exception is the scientific research provi-
sion. There I accept that it is inevitable that since we have claimed 
fishery jurisdiction out to 200 miles, 14 other nations are going to 
claim scientific research jurisdiction out to 200 miles. With that 
exception, I think that you are absolutely correct and that the 
7. 8 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (6th Sess.) 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.62/WP.10 (1977). 
8. Id. at 6 (Part II, 2 of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text). 
9. Id. at 7 (Part II, 3 of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text). 
10. Id. at 16 (Part VI of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text). 
11. Id. at 10 (Part III of the Informal Composit Negotiating Text). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Fishery Conservation Zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). 
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Murphy-Breaux position is wrong. But if we enact this legislation, 
in my judgment it will not be because of a demonstrated need for 
the deep seabed minerals. I agree with what Ambassador Aldrich 
said earlier: That while there is a need in the future, there is no 
immediate need for the passage of this legislation to get these miner-
als before the end of the century. If we pass the law, as I expect we 
will, it will be because of impatience with two things: First, the slow 
pace of negotiations and second, the perceived lack of leadership by 
the President in this area, similar to his perceived lack of leadership 
this year in other areas of foreign affairs. But the real reason that 
we will enact this legislation will be due to the conviction of Con-
gress. If after the May negotiations it appears that an ultimate 
treaty will not be ratifiable by the Senate, then I would have a hard 
time arguing that we should defer legislation of this kind because 
of some possibility that the international community will rise in 
armed rebellion. 
MR. LEE: Mr. Chairman, in my presentation 15 I did not refer to 
the developing countries' view regarding the question of assured 
access. I think perhaps I should be allowed to make a supplemen-
tary statement. 
In the last session, after the chairman of Negotiating Group I, 
Ambassador Njenga from Kenya, presented what he referred to as 
the compromise formula on Annex II relating to additions for explo-
ration and exploitation of minerals in the deep seabed, 16 the Group 
of Seventy-seven had a meeting. After three hours of debate, the 
general view that emerged was that the text assured guaranteed 
access to private firms and companies. This is their interpretation. 
You have pointed out that the industries and the Congress find it 
difficult after reading the complicated versions of the treaty to 
clearly conclude whether or not there is assured access. I think this 
illustrates a difficulty that is inherent in international legislation. 
You cannot expect a piece of international legislation to be written 
in clear terms. The reason for this is that it involves over 150 coun-
tries which present many different views and often have diametri-
cally opposed interests and concerns. The provisions always give a 
little in one place just to take it back somewhere else. The develop-
ing countries examine these provisions and draw one clear conclu-
15. Lee, Developing Countries and the Law of the Sea Conference, 6 SYR. J. INT'L L. & 
CoM. 213. 
16. 10 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (7th Sess.) 126, at 137-
43, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/RCNG/2. 
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sion. Namely, that the treaty provides for assured access. We will 
have to recognize this inherent difficulty in international legislation. 
You also refer to the slow pace of negotiations. I think we all 
recognize that this Conference is dealing with over 100 sub-items 
and twenty-five major items, and it has taken us about ten years. 
Perhaps from that point of view it appears to be a long process. But 
if we look at our daily life, there are so many decisions which cannot 
be made in a very short time. When we are negotiating with 150 
different states, with such complex and complicated issues, perhaps 
the process is not that unduly long. ·what I think we have to recog-
nize is that the solutions we are contemplating will be reasonable 
and will achieve the objectives we intend to obtain. Thank you. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I have to concede that the Congress 
is often guilty of writing ambiguous legislation with some delibera-
tion which takes the courts years to resolve. We sometimes try to 
cure that by including a legislative history which is clear in terms 
of the debates that this language means a certain thing. I think we 
could probably have a treaty tomorrow if the Group of Seventy-
seven issued a clear statement that they interpret the language of 
this agreement to allow United States companies, each of which 
offers reasonable opportunity for consortia partnership participa-
tion to any company in the Third World, to have the right to pro-
ceed with deep seabed mining by the year 1986. If that kind of a 
clear statement were made interpreting this language, ambiguous 
though it may be, so that a court would have clear guidance, I think 
that would probably end the danger of United States legislation this 
year. If Mr. Lee's optimism is correct and the leader of the Group 
of Seventy-seven can issue such a statement, perhaps we will have 
a treaty. I would be interested in Ambassador Aldrich's comments 
on that. 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: Well, I would like to reinforce the opti-
mistic side of your nature, Congressman, because your pessimism 
is all too well counted on past experience. I do think that inevitably 
in treaties, even with the best of goodwill and in fact without great 
differences of meaning behind them, the text often does not say as 
clearly as we would like what we intend it to say. This is true, in 
part, because you have to negotiate the treaty in so many different 
languages and they do not all fit together. But as important as any 
other single thing we can do in the Law of the Sea Conference, I 
think we should obtain agreement on rewriting a number of provi-
sions in ways that make their meanings clearer. I think the proce-
dure by which the law of the sea draft treaty was put together, with 
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various individual committee chairmen doing their own drafting, 
was almost guaranteed to create a text that does not hold together 
as a whole, has internal inconsistancies beyond the norm, and will 
create unnecessary problems if allowed to go forward that way. But 
I think we will find that if we can solve most of the substantive 
issues then there will be the desire in the Conference to produce a 
much better text for signature than the one we see today. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: In that connection, might I ask if 
there is any consensus in the Conference of establishing a drafts-
manship committee which might be delegated to cleanup and clar-
ify the language of the present text. This was the procedure used for 
the United States Constitution in order to place it in a condition 
which finally led to its ratification by nine states. If a draftsmanship 
committee could be agreed upon by the Conference at this spring 
meeting to clarify the treaty text so that the Senate of the United 
States could perceive that the guaranteed access was, as Mr. Lee 
suggested, indeed the intention of the Group of Seventy-seven, I 
would think that we could reach a treaty. Is there any hope of a 
draftsmanship committee procedurally accomplishing that essen-
tial result? 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: I think there is considerable hope of that. 
It comes in really several stages. First, improvements can be made 
by the various negotiating groups themselves which are in the pro-
cess of revising parts of this language. I know that the chairman of 
the first negotiating group, for example, has already told us that he 
plans to point out at the outset of the aid session that Annex II needs 
to be rewritten in a clearer form. Then when the discussion is fin-
ished, he intends to produce a revised text that will be clearer. The 
second stage involves the drafting committee. Fortunately we do 
have a drafting committee in the Conference and it is chaired by the 
most able representative of Canada, Allen Beaslly. They have not 
had enough to do and it is about time we put them to work. 
MR. HERMAN: George, I agree with you wholeheartedly on that 
last point. One of the problems at the Conference is that the texts 
which are produced have, in some respects, little chance of being 
altered by the drafting committee. This is because the texts are 
essentially the product of political process and while we have not 
tested the scope of the mandate of the drafting committee, it could 
be fairly restricted under the present process of negotiations. 
I think this afternoon, if we get the opportunity, we should 
come back to the simplification exercise because I personally believe 
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that is the key to the future of the Conference. I know that there 
are participants here that also have views on that score. 
MR. HULL: Thank you very much. 
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